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Abstract
Road network junctions, such as merges and diverges, often act as bottlenecks that initiate
and exacerbate congestion. More complex junction configurations lead to more complex driver
behaviors, resulting in aggregate congestion patterns that are more difficult to predict and
mitigate. In this paper, we discuss diverge configurations where vehicles on some lanes can
enter only one of the downstream roads, but vehicles on other lanes can enter one of several
downstream roads. Counterintuitively, these bifurcating lanes, rather than relieving congestion
(by acting as a versatile resource that can serve either downstream road as the demand changes),
often cause enormous congestion due to lane changing. We develop an aggregate lane–changing
model for this situation that is expressive enough to model drivers’ choices and the resultant
congestion, but simple enough to easily analyze. We use a game–theoretic framework to model
the aggregate lane choice behavior of selfish vehicles as a Wardrop equilibrium (an aggregate
type of Nash equilibrium). We then establish the existence and uniqueness of this equilibrium.
We explain how our model can be easily calibrated using simulation data or real data, and
we present results showing that our model successfully predicts the aggregate behavior that
emerges from widely–used behavioral lane–changing models. Our model’s expressiveness, ease
of calibration, and accuracy may make it a useful tool for mitigating congestion at these complex
diverges.
1 Introduction
Road traffic congestion is a major source of inefficiency in modern society. One study [1] estimated
that, in 2014 in the U.S. alone, delays due to congestion cost drivers over 7 billion hours, had a
social cost of US $160 billion, and led to the burning of 3 billion extra gallons of fuel.
In the transportation community, it is well known that vehicles’ lane change maneuvers can be a
significant cause of congestion. Unfortunately, lane changes are notoriously difficult to model, both
because it is difficult to predict when and why a driver might change lanes and how their maneuver
will affect the movements of other vehicles [2]. In what follows, we briefly review relevant papers
to our work, beginning with papers that analyze lane changing from the microscopic perspective
and following with papers that analyze it from the macroscopic perspective.
A significant number of papers that analyze lane changes at the “microscopic level” focus
on determining accurate yet simple driver behavior models that will be able to reproduce actual
∗Ruolin Li, Negar Mehr and Roberto Horowitz are with the Mechanical Engineering Department, University of
California, Berkeley, CA, USA. {ruolin li, negar.mehr, horowitz}@berkeley.edu
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
08
35
8v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
7 A
pr
 20
19
Figure 1: Satellite imagery from Google Earth of the MacArthur Maze with an enlarged view of a
typical diverge with a bifurcating lane.
individual vehicle’s lane changing behavior on a variety of scenarios. In [3], a model of a driver’s
lane changing decision-making process is formulated, focusing on decisions that balance safety
concerns with lane-changing incentives. These decisions require a series of evaluations concerning
the velocity and proximity of the vehicles that surround the ego vehicle in the lane that it wishes
to change to. Much work, both theoretical and simulation-based, has taken place on so-called “gap
acceptance models”, which model whether a driver will attempt to change lanes as a function of the
inter-vehicle gaps that arise in their target lane (see [4–6], among others). Subsequently, researchers
have explored a variety of rule-based microscopic models. In [7], for example, a new lane changing
model, MOBIL, is proposed to minimize the overall braking induced by lane change. Microscopic
level research in vehicles’ lane changing behavior also considers various traffic scenarios and road
configurations. For example, in [8, 9], the lane changing behavior in a merging scenario is studied.
Recently, a series of papers have been presented that study microscopic lane changing behavior
using game theory, such as [10,11], which have brought new perspectives and insights to the field.
Another considerable part of related work addresses the “macroscopic” impact of vehicles’ lane
changing behavior, i.e., how lane changes affect other vehicles and the aggregate traffic flow. In [12,
13], researchers studied the macroscopic characteristics that could affect vehicles’ lane changing
behavior. Subsequently, in [14], lane changing behaviors of vehicles entering a freeway on-ramp
and how it affects the onset of congestion are examined. In [15], lane changing behaviors are also
explored from a macroscopic perspective and it is shown that lane changing behaviors frequently
cause the well known “freeway capacity drop” phenomenon. Subsequently, [16, 17] analyzed the
macroscopic impacts qualitatively and quantitatively of lane changing behaviors focused on the
section of lanes away from freeway diverges, by modeling lane changing vehicles as particles linking
interactive streams on different lanes. In our previous work [18], a scenario where vehicles bypass at
the end of the diverge is studied, and the macroscopic choice behavior of vehicles of such a process
is modeled as a Wardrop equilibrium [19]. The resulting model shows an impressive predictive
power and can be easily calibrated.
In this paper, we extend the framework in [18] to analyze another commonly encountered traffic
diverging scenario that is a frequent cause of bottlenecks: bifurcating lanes at traffic diverges.
Figure 2 illustrates this diverge scenario, where the center lane “b” bifurcates such that vehicles
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Figure 2: Problem setting: a traffic diverge with a bifurcating lane targeting two exit links.
in that lane must choose either to turn left or right. Bifurcating lanes are encountered in (poorly
designed) complex distribution structures, such as the four-freeway interchange in the San Francisco
Bay Area known as the MacArthur Maze (see Figure 1), where consecutive diverges with bifurcating
lanes are employed to split the I-80 west / I-580 east (Eastshore Freeway) traffic into 1) traffic going
towards San Francisco via the I-80 west (Bay Bridge), 2) traffic going towards downtown Oakland,
Walnut Creek, Hayward or Stockton via I-580 east (MacArthur Freeway) and I-980, and 3) traffic
going towards San Jose via I-880 south (Nimitz Freeway). An aerial photograph of the MacArthur
Maze is shown in Figure 1.
Vehicles targeting one of the two exit links of the diverge face two choices. One is to employ
a feed-through lane lane (either lane ”a” or lane ”c” Fig. 2), while the other is to employ the
bifurcating lane. With the reasonable assumption that drivers choose their routes in a selfish
manner in order to minimize their travel time or effort, vehicles would only employ the bifurcating
middle lane in order to save time or effort, as compared to using the exit’s respective feed–through
lane, and vice versa. It turns out that vehicular lane choice behavior for this scenario has its own
interesting characteristics, which to the best of our knowledge, has not been previously addressed
in the literature. In this paper, we first derive a model that describes the decision making process
encountered by drivers at such traffic diverges and then we obtain the macroscopic lane choices made
by drivers by solving the model’s corresponding Wardrop equilibrium. It should be emphasized that
the calibration of our model only requires traffic flow information, which is realistically attainable.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we first provide a detailed description of the
notation used throughout the paper and subsequently derive a model that describes the decision
making process of drivers at traffic diverges with middle bifurcating lanes. In Section 3, we establish
the existence and uniqueness of the Wardrop equilibrium introduced by our model. In Section 4,
we describe our model calibration and validation process using microscopic traffic simulation data.
Finally, in Section 5, we conclude our work and briefly discuss future directions.
2 The Model
In this paper, we consider a vehicular traffic diverge with a middle bifurcating lane. Such di-
verges are commonly used in a variety of modern transportation roadways, such as the well–known
MacArthur Maze (see Figure 1), in the San Francisco Bay Area. A schematic of such a traffic
diverge is shown in Figure 2. The diverge has two exit links, respectively denoted as link 1 and
link 2, each consisting of two lanes, and a single entry link with three lanes respectively denoted by
the letters a, b, and c. Vehicles traveling along feed-through lanes a and c respectively exit directly
to links 1 and 2. However, vehicles traveling along the middle bifurcating lane b can exit to either
link. Thus, drivers upstream of such a traffic diverge need to decide between two options. They can
either use the feed–through lane that is designed to exclusively serve its corresponding destination
link, or conversely they can use the middle bifurcating lane, which targets both exit links and is
shared by vehicles targeting both exit links. For example, referring to Fig. 2, vehicles targeting
link 1 may choose to utilize feed–through lane a or the bifurcating lane b. To model lane changing
behavior upstream of this diverge, we consider 4 classes of vehicles. For either exit link, vehicles
are either feed–through lane users or bifurcating lane users.
Here, some key points should be clarified. First, in this paper we model the macroscopic
lane changing behavior of a given vehicular flow, instead of attempting to model the decision
making process of individual vehicles. Thus, features related to individual vehicles’ choices are not
considered. Second, we will set the flow demands of both exit links within a feasible range, in order
to exclude potential teleporting behavior of vehicles (i.e. vehicles disappear at the upstream link
and then re–appear at a link downstream of the diverge), which is observed in several microscopic
traffic models. Only bifurcating lane choice behavior will be studied in this work. Third, we assume
that the capacity of either exit link is large enough to accommodate the corresponding demand.
The impact of capacity drop downstream of the diverge is not considered in this work.
Let I = {1, 2} be the index set of exit links at the diverge, and let L = {a, b, c} be the index set
of the entry link’s lanes. At the diverge in Figure 2, lane a is the feed–through lane targeting exit
link 1. Lane c is the feed–through lane targeting exit link 2. Lane b is the middle bifurcating lane
targeting both link 1 and 2. We assume that the total demand for the diverge is fixed and given.
For each exit link i ∈ I, let di be the demand of vehicles targeting exit link i, and let qi := di∑
i∈I di
be the normalized demand of vehicles with destination link i. We collect the normalized demands
and let Q := (qi : i ∈ I) be the normalized demand configuration vector. For a diverge with the
exit index set I and the normalized demand configuration vector Q, we should have
∑
i∈I qi = 1.
For each exit link i ∈ I, let nfi be the exact flow of feed–through lane users with destination
link i and let nbi be the exact flow of bifurcating lane users with destination link i. For each i ∈ I,
let xfi :=
nfi∑
i∈I di
be the proportion of feed–through lane users with destination link i. Likewise, for
each i ∈ I, we let xbi := n
b
i∑
i∈I di
be the proportion of bifurcating lane users with destination link i.
We then collect the proportions of the four classes of vehicles transiting through the diverge into
the vector x := (xfi , x
b
i : i ∈ I). For a given normalized demand configuration vector Q, we will use
our model to predict the flow distribution vector x. A flow vector x is feasible if it is non–negative
and it satisfies flow conservation:
qi = x
f
i + x
b
i , ∀i ∈ I,
xfi ≥ 0, xbi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I.
(1)
We assume all vehicles are selfish in that drivers will choose the route that minimizes their
travel cost, which will be defined subsequently. That is to say, in this bifurcating lane scenario,
vehicles would only choose the bifurcating lane when the cost experienced when traveling through
the bifurcating lane is less than the cost experienced when traveling through the feed–through lane.
We assume that vehicles of the same class, which are vehicles targeting the same destination link
and utilizing the same entry lane, experience the same cost. We now model the cost experienced
by each class of vehicles. For each exit link i ∈ I, let Jfi denote the cost experienced by the feed–
through lane users with destination link i, let Jbi denote the cost experienced by the bifurcating
lane users with destination link i. We now postulate that
Jfi (x) = C
f
i x
f
i . (2)
For each exit link i ∈ I, we let Cfi represent the cost incurred by feed–through lane users targeting
exit link i. For each exit link i ∈ I, we assume that Cfi > 0 and it is a parameter related to the
intrinsic features of the utilized feed–through lane, including the geometry, speed limits and other
factors. To be specific in Figure 2, for exit link 1, Cf1 should be a parameter related to the intrinsic
features of the feed–through lane a. For each exit link i ∈ I, since the feed–through lane is only
shared by the feed–through lane users that exit through link i, the cost experienced by all users
should be proportional to the proportion of the feed–through lane users that exit through link i.
Thus, for each exit link i ∈ I, we let the cost, Jfi , to be the product of Cfi and xfi , as described by
Eq. (2).
Let us now focus on the cost experienced by users of the middle bifurcating lane. For exit links
i 6= j ∈ I, we model the cost experienced by the bifurcating lane users with destination link i as
Jbi (x) = C
b
(
λix
b
i + µix
b
j
)
+ νxbix
b
j , (3)
where Cb is a parameter characterizing the cost incurred by bifurcating lane users targeting either
exit link. Likewise to feed–through lanes, we assume Cb > 0 and that it is a parameter related to
the intrinsic features of the bifurcating lane. Since the bifurcating lane is shared by the bifurcating
lane users for either exit link, the cost experienced by the users should be proportional to the sum of
the proportions of the bifurcating lane users for either exit. Vehicles travelling along the bifurcating
lane must take either of the two exit links at the end of the diverge, which might give rise to a
sudden capacity increase for the bifurcating lane users targeting either exit link. This expected
capacity increase would reduce the cost experienced by the bifurcating lane users. To account
for this phenomenon, we define for each exit link i two positive parameters λi ≤ 1 and µi ≤ 1.
These parameters respectively characterize the possible capacity increase effect on bifurcating lane
users targeting exit link i incurred by bifurcating lane users with the same destination link and the
effect incurred by bifurcating lane users with a different destination link. If the effect is the same
regardless of the inconsistency of the destination link, we should have λi = µi; otherwise, λi 6= µi.
If either of the capacity increase effect is negligible, we will have λi = 1 or µi = 1.
The second term in Eq. (3), which has the positive constant parameter ν is used to account
for the detrimental effect on travel cost induced by the destination heterogeneity of the bifurcating
lane users. This detrimental effect should increase when either of the two bifurcating lane vehicular
flows increase. Therefore, we utilize the product between the two bifurcating lane proportions
νxbix
b
j , i 6= j ∈ I in this term.
Thus, Eqs. (2) and (3) for i 6= j ∈ I, are used to describe the costs experienced by vehicles
traveling through the diverge. We collect these cost parameters in these equations, and define
C = (Cfi , C
b, λi, µi, ν : i ∈ I) to be the cost coefficient vector characterizing the diverge.
Having modeled the costs (2) and (3), we will model vehicles’ choice behavior on the macroscopic
level. We assume that once a lane choice is made by the vehicle, it stays on its chosen lane. Since
we have assumed that all vehicles are selfish, vehicles would only choose the bifurcating lane when
the cost experienced by traveling on the bifurcating lane is smaller than the cost experienced by
traveling on the corresponding feed–through lane. Using the notations in our model, we can say,
at the equilibrium of vehicles’ choice behavior, if xbi > 0, then we must have J
b
i (x) ≤ Jfi (x);
likewise, if xfi > 0, then we must have J
f
i (x) ≤ Jbi (x). Therefore, at an equilibrium of our model,
if Jfi (x) > J
b
i (x), then x
f
i = 0; if J
f
i (x) < J
b
i (x), then x
b
i = 0; only if J
f
i (x) = J
b
i (x), x
b
i and x
f
i
may both be nonzero. These conditions can be formulated as a Wardrop equilibrium [19]. Now, let
C = (Cfi , C
b, λi, µi, ν : i ∈ I) be the cost coefficient vector and Q = (qi : i ∈ I) be the normalized
demand configuration vector. Let G = (Q,C) be a tuple configuring a traffic diverge in Figure 2,
we interpret the above equilibrium conditions of our model and give the formal definition of the
equilibrium of our model:
Definition 1. For a given G = (Q,C), a flow distribution vector x is an equilibrium if and only if
for every i 6= j ∈ I, we have
xfi (J
f
i (x)− Jbi (x)) ≤ 0,
xbi(J
b
i (x)− Jfi (x)) ≤ 0.
(4)
Now that we have modeled the cost experienced by each class of vehicles and model the resulting
choice equilibrium as a Wardrop equilibrium described in Definition 1, we can use this model to
predict the proportion of bifurcating lane users and feed–through lane users for either exit link.
3 Equilibrium Properties
In this section, we will first establish the existence of the equilibrium induced by our model. Then,
we will derive the sufficient conditions under which the existing equilibrium is guaranteed to be
unique. Therefore, once the sufficient conditions are met, our model could be applied to the
prediction of the proportions of bifurcating lane users and feed–through lane users.
3.1 Equilibrium Existence
We will first directly give a proposition based on the existence theorem stated and proved in [20].
Proposition 1. Given a tuple G = (Q,C) configuring a traffic diverge in Figure 2, for each exit
link i ∈ I, if each of the cost functions Jfi (x), Jbi (x) is continuous and monotone in x, there exists
at least one Wardrop equilibrium (as described in Definition 1) for G.
From Equations (2) and (3), we observe that Jbi (x) and J
b
i (x) are both continuous and monotone
in the sense of non-decreasing in x. Thus, by Proposition 1, we conclude the existence of the
equilibrium described in Definition 1.
3.2 Equilibrium Uniqueness
As for the uniqueness of the induced equilibrium, we will use a similar method as what we have
stated in our previous work [18]. The basic idea is that we will first construct an equivalent Nash
equilibrium of our equilibrium model. Then we will prove under certain conditions the uniqueness
of the constructed Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the uniqueness of the Wardrop equilibrium induced
by our model is concluded by equivalence.
For any tuple G = (Q,C) configuring a traffic diverge in Figure 2, we construct a two–player
auxiliary game G˜ = 〈I, A, (J˜i : i ∈ I)〉. Here, I = {1, 2} is the index set of our players. Let
A = A1 × A2 be the action space, Ai = [0, qi] be the action set of player i, and J˜i be the cost
associated with each player i ∈ I. Let y = (yi, i ∈ I) be the vector of actions taken by the players
of the game G˜. To further build the correspondence, for each player i ∈ I, we let
yi = x
b
i . (5)
Then, for the cost associated with each player i, we define
J˜i(y) :=
(
Jfi (x)− Jbi (x)
)2
. (6)
Next, we employ the definition of the constructed Nash equilibrium stated in [18]:
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Figure 3: Three possible sketches of Jfi (x
b
i) and J
b
i (x
b
i) in the region of x
b
i ∈ [0, qi].
Definition 2. For the auxiliary game G˜, y = (yi : i ∈ I) is a pure Nash equilibrium if and only if
for every i 6= j ∈ I,
yi = Bi(yj)
= argminyi∈[0,qi]J˜i(y),
(7)
where Bi is the best response function of player i.
Now that we have constructed a Nash equilibrium, we will use the following lemma to establish
the equivalence between the Wardrop equilibrium of G and the Nash equilibrium of G˜.
Lemma 1. A flow distribution vector x = (xfi , x
b
i : i ∈ I) is a Wardrop equilibrium for G if and
only if y = (xbi , i ∈ I) is a pure Nash equilibrium for G˜.
Proof. First, using flow constraints (1), let us write Jfi (x) and J
b
i (x) in terms of variables x
b
i . For
each exit link i ∈ I, we have
Jfi (x) = C
f
i (qi − xbi), (8)
Jbi (x) = C
b
(
λix
b
i + µix
b
j
)
+ νxbix
b
j . (9)
Then, for each exit link i ∈ I, we calculate the derivatives of the costs with respect to xbi :
∂Jfi
∂xbi
= −Cfi , (10)
∂Jbi
∂xbi
= Cbλi + νx
b
j . (11)
Notice that in Equation (10) and (11), given all coefficients are positive, for each exit link i ∈ I,
∂Jfi
∂xbi
is always negative and equals to a constant, i.e., Jfi (x) is a linear function of x
b
i with a negative
slope. For each exit link i 6= j ∈ I, due to the flow constraints (1), xbj is always nonnegative, thus
∂Jbi
∂xbi
is always positive and increases as xbj increases.
We now will show sketches of Jfi (x) and J
b
i (x) in the region of x
b
i ∈ [0, qi]. There are 3 possible
cases of the sketch and we draw each possibility in Figure 3. We then complete the proof of
equivalence case by case.
• Case (a): In this scenario, for every xbi ∈ [0, qi], we have Jfi (xbi) > Jbi (xbi). To minimize
the cost associated with player i in Equation (6), we have yi = qi at the constructed Nash
equilibrium. Since we let yi = x
b
i , we have x
b
i = qi. Then due to flow constraints (1), we have
xbi = qi, x
f
i = 0, where J
f
i (x
b
i) > J
b
i (x
b
i). This meets the conditions in Definition 1, thus the
constructed Nash equilibrium leads to the Wardrop equilibrium. At a Wardrop equilibrium
where Jfi (x
b
i) > J
b
i (x
b
i), we can conclude that x
f
i = 0, x
b
i = qi. This leads to yi = qi. From plot
(a), we can see that, the cost associated with player i is minimized. Therefore, the Wardrop
equilibrium is also a constructed Nash equilibrium. In this case, the Wardrop equilibrium is
equivalent to the constructed Nash equilibrium.
• Case (b): In this case, Jfi (xbi) and Jbi (xbi) have an intersection. Let us denote the xbi at the
intersection as x¯bi . Then we have J
f
i (x¯
b
i) = J
b
i (x¯
b
i). At the Nash equilibrium, we let yi = x¯
b
i ,
therefore the minimum possible cost associated with player i is reached, which is 0. At
this time, Wardrop conditions in Definition 1 are tight and met. Therefore, the constructed
Nash equilibrium is also the Wardrop equilibrium. Reversely, when Jfi (x
b
i) = J
b
i (x
b
i) at the
Wardrop equilibrium, from plot (b), xbi could only equal to x¯
b
i . This results in a zero cost,
which is the minimum possible value of the cost. Therefore, a Nash equilibrium is reached.
The equivalence of Wardrop equilibrium and its constructed Nash equilibrium is established
for this case.
• Case (c): This case is similar to case (a). For every xbi ∈ [0, qi], we have Jfi (xbi) < Jbi (xbi). To
minimize the cost associated with player i in Equation (6), we have yi = 0 at the constructed
Nash equilibrium. Since we let yi = x
b
i , we have x
b
i = 0. Then due to flow constraints (1),
we have xbi = 0, x
f
i = qi, where J
f
i (x
b
i) < J
b
i (x
b
i). This meets the conditions in Definition 1,
thus the constructed Nash equilibrium leads to the Wardrop equilibrium. At a Wardrop
equilibrium where Jfi (x
b
i) < J
b
i (x
b
i), we can conclude that x
f
i = qi, x
b
i = 0. This leads to
yi = 0. From plot (c), we can see that the cost associated with player i is minimized.
Therefore, the Wardrop equilibrium is also a constructed Nash equilibrium. In this case, the
Wardrop equilibrium is equivalent to the constructed Nash equilibrium.
Now in all cases, we have proved the equivalence between the Wardrop equilibrium and the
constructed Nash equilibrium. Then, we use the following lemma to establish the uniqueness of the
constructed Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 2. For an auxiliary game G˜, the Nash equilibrium flow vector y in Definition 2 is unique
if for each player i ∈ I:
(λi − µi)Cb ≥ ν − Cfi . (12)
Proof. At a Nash equilibrium, for each player i 6= j ∈ I, we have
yi = Bi(yj). (13)
For each player i 6= j ∈ I, we can rewrite (13) as
yi = Bi(Bj(yi)). (14)
Equation (14) indicates that y is an equilibrium if and only if for every i 6= j ∈ I, yi is a fixed
point for function g(z) = Bi (Bj(z)). Thereby, the number of the fixed points of function g(z) =
Bi (Bj(z)) equals the number of equilibria. To guarantee the uniqueness of the equilibrium, we
have to guarantee the uniqueness of the fixed point of function g(z) = Bi (Bj(z)). Notice that a
fixed point z∗ of function g(z) must satisfy
g(z∗) = z∗. (15)
Therefore, the fixed point z∗ can be found by intersecting the identity function h(z) = z and
function g(z). Thus, the basic idea of the following proof is to show that under (12), for every
player i 6= j ∈ I, the slope of function g(z) = Bi (Bj(z)) is always non-negative and smaller than
1. Therefore, with yi ≥ 0, function g(z) = Bi (Bj(z)) can intersect the identity function at most
once, which will establish the uniqueness of the fixed point of function g(z) = Bi (Bj(z)). Then we
can conclude the uniqueness of the constructed Nash equilibrium.
First, for each player i 6= j ∈ I, we explore dBi(yj)dyj . Back to the three cases when we prove
Lemma 1, for case (a) and case (c), yi = Bi(yj) is always equal to qi or 0 no matter how yj changes,
therefore, dBidyj = 0. Then the slope of function g(z) = Bi (Bj(z)) is always 0. Thus we only need to
explore
dBi(yj)
dyj
in case (c), where Jfi (x
b
i) and J
b
i (x
b
i) intersect in the region of x
b
i ∈ [0, qi]. Remember
that, we let yi = x
b
i , for simplicity, we use x
b
i instead of yi in the following proof. Using the same
notations as the proof of Lemma 1, in case (c), with a given xbj , let J
f
i (x
b
i) and J
b
i (x
b
i) intersect at
x¯bi(x
b
j) ∈ [0, qi]. For x¯bi(xbj), we must have
Jfi (x¯
b
i , x
b
j)− Jbi (x¯bi , xbj) = 0. (16)
Using implicit differentiation of Jfi (x¯
b
i , x
b
j)− Jbi (x¯bi , xbj) with respect to xbj , we have
∂
∂xbi
(
Jfi (x¯
b
i , x
b
j)− Jbi (x¯bi , xbj)
) dx¯bi(xbj)
dxbj
+
∂
∂xbj
(
Jfi (x¯
b
i , x
b
j)− Jbi (x¯bi , xbj)
)
= 0.
(17)
Using Equations (8) and (9), we have
∂Jfi
∂xbj
= 0, (18)
∂Jbi
∂xbj
= Cbµi + νx
b
i . (19)
Since xbi ≥ 0, we can conclude that for every i 6= j ∈ I, ∂J
f
i
∂xbj
is always 0 and
∂Jbi
∂xbj
is always positive.
Therefore, we have
∂
∂xbj
(
Jfi (x¯
b
i , x
b
j)− Jbi (x¯bi , xbj)
)
≤ 0. (20)
From Equations (10) and (11) , we have
∂
∂xbi
(
Jfi (x¯
b
i , x
b
j)− Jbi (x¯bi , xbj)
)
≤ 0. (21)
Thus, using Equation (17), we conclude that
dx¯bi(x
b
j)
dxbj
≤ 0. (22)
Intuitively, from plot (b), when xbj increases, J
f
i (x¯
b
i , x
b
j) stays the same, whereas J
b
i (x¯
b
i , x
b
j) increases.
The intersection climbs leftwards, therefore, x¯bi decreases.
To guarantee, for every player i 6= j ∈ I, that the slope of g(z) = Bi (Bj(z)) is always non-
negative and smaller than 1, based on the chain rule, we have to guarantee that the slope of
Bi(yj) is always non-positive and bigger than −1, i.e., −1 ≤ dx¯
b
i (x
b
j)
dxbj
≤ 0. Now we plug Equa-
tions (10), (11), (18) and (19) into Equation (17), we have
(
−Cfi − Cbλi − νxbj
) dx¯bi(xbj)
dxbj
+(
−Cbµi − νxbi
)
= 0.
(23)
For each player i 6= j ∈ I, to ensure −1 ≤ dx¯
b
i (x
b
j)
dxbj
≤ 0, we need to guarantee
Cfi + C
bλi + νx
b
j ≥ Cbµi + νxbi . (24)
Let M(xbi , x
b
j) = C
f
i + C
bλi + νx
b
j − Cbµi − νxbi , we need to guarantee that min M(xbi , xbj) ≥ 0.
Since M(xbi , x
b
j) is negatively linear in x
b
i and positively linear in x
b
j , the minimum possible value
of M(xbi , x
b
j) must be greater than the value of the extreme point, M(1, 0) = C
f
i +C
bλi−Cbµi− ν.
Thus, we just need to guarantee that M(1, 0) ≥ 0, which is as we stated in Lemma 2.
Thus, for every player i 6= j ∈ I, under condition (12), the slope of g(z) = Bi (Bj(z)) is always
nonnegative and smaller than 1. Therefore, with yi ≥ 0, g(z) = Bi (Bj(z)) can intersect the identity
line at most once, which establishes the uniqueness of the fixed point of function g(z) = Bi (Bj(z)).
Thus, we can conclude the uniqueness of the constructed Nash equilibrium.
We then give the following theorem to establish the uniqueness of the Wardrop equilibrium as
described in Definition 1.
Theorem 1. For a game G = (Q,C), the equilibrium flow vector x in Definition 1 is unique if for
each exit link i ∈ I:
(λi − µi)Cb ≥ ν − Cfi . (25)
Proof. From Lemma 2, we know that the constructed Nash equilibrium in Definition 2 is unique
under condition (25). By Lemma 1, we conclude that the constructed Nash equilibrium is equivalent
to the Wardrop equilibrium in the sense of Definition 1. Thus, we can conclude that the Wardrop
equilibrium as described in Definition 1 is unique.
Notice that Theorem 1 only gives a sufficient but not necessary condition of the uniqueness
of the equilibrium. This implies if condition (25) is met, we can guarantee the uniqueness of the
equilibrium; however, if condition (25) is not met, it is also possible that the Wardrop equilibrium
is unique.
Figure 4: An enlarged view of the traffic diverge with a bifurcating lane in SUMO.
4 Simulation Studies
Now that we have characterized the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium induced by our
model, we are going to test the performance of our model in terms of how it accurately describes
steady state vehicular flow data generated by a micro-simulation flow model.
In this paper, we generate vehicular steady state flow data for model calibration and validation
using the traffic microscopic simulation software SUMO [21], which is commonly utilized by the
transportation community. In the simulations, to ensure the reliability of the generated data, we set
the SUMO car following model to be the default Krauss model, which is also known as the stochastic
version of the Gipps’ model. To be specific, the Krauss model supports stochastic driving behavior
by setting an imperfection parameter sigma. The imperfection parameter sigma, which ranges from
0 to 1, represents the degree of randomness of vehicles’ behavior. When sigma is set to nonzero,
drivers will randomly vary their speed. In the simulations, we set sigma to a default value of 0.5,
in order to realistically mimic vehicle randomness. An enlarged view of the established diverge in
SUMO is shown in Figure 4. To ensure that the data we collect truly reveals the equilibrium state,
we set the entry link to be sufficiently long and only recorded the proportions of different classes
of vehicles (x := (xfi , x
b
i : i ∈ I)), downstream of the diverge when the simulation has run for a
sufficiently long time to reach the steady state.
4.1 Model Calibration
Notice that the cost coefficient vector C = (Cfi , C
b, λi, µi, ν : i ∈ I) is related to the intrinsic
features of a diverge. Thus, it is necessary to first calibrate the cost coefficient vector C in the
model for a given diverge before we use the model for prediction. For the diverge shown in Figure 4,
let the exit link index set be Iexit = {1, 2}. We define K to be the total number of data points
that we need for calibration. For each data point, we run the simulation once, until it reaches
an equilibrium state. We pick an appropriate total demand, D, of vehicles entering the diverge
and fix it for all K simulations. For every simulation, we randomize the demand configuration for
either exit link. In the kth simulation to generate the kth data point, we let dk1 be the demand of
vehicles targeting exit link 1 and similarly, let dk2 be the demand of vehicles targeting exit link 2.
For each 1 ≤ k ≤ K, we should have dk1 +dk2 = D. Now, for each 1 ≤ k ≤ K, we define qk1 := q
k
1
D and
qk2 :=
qk2
D to be the normalized demand for exit link 1 and exit link 2 and we should have q
k
1 +q
k
2 = 1.
Then we let Qk := {qk1 , qk2} to be the kth flow configuration vector for the kth simulation. After
the simulation has reached the equilibrium, for each exit link i ∈ Iexit, we record the proportions
of the feed–through lane users (xfi )
k and the bifurcating lane users (xbi)
k. For each 1 ≤ k ≤ K,
we collect the proportions in the flow distribution vector xk = {(xfi )k, (xbi)k : i ∈ Iexit}. Now, for
each 1 ≤ k ≤ K, we define a tuple (Qk, xk). Then using these K tuples, we employ the method
developed in [18] for calibration, which we briefly describe below.
We want to find a cost coefficient vector C = (Cfi , C
b, λi, µi, ν : i ∈ Iexit) that can enable as
many as possible of the K data points to meet the conditions in Definition 1. To deal with the
variational inequalities when encoding the conditions in Definition 1 for each data point, for every
1 ≤ k ≤ K and i ∈ Iexit, we define binary variables (efi )k and (ebi)k as
(xfi )
k(Jfi (x
k)− Jbi (xk)) ≤ 0⇐⇒ (efi )k = 0, (26a)
(xfi )
k(Jfi (x
k)− Jbi (xk)) > 0⇐⇒ (efi )k = 1, (26b)
(xbi)
k(Jbi (x
k)− Jfi (xk)) ≤ 0⇐⇒ (ebi)k = 0, (26c)
(xbi)
k(Jbi (x
k)− Jfi (xk)) > 0⇐⇒ (ebi)k = 1. (26d)
This way, we use the binary variables (efi )
k and (ebi)
k to indicate for (xfi )
k and (xbi)
k in each
data point whether the conditions in Definition 1 are violated. To optimize for C, we will minimize
the sum of binary variables (efi )
k and (ebi)
k for all i ∈ Iexit and 1 ≤ k ≤ K. Moreover, to solve the
optimization problem, we transfer the constraints in Equations (26) as in [22]. We set T as a large
positive number, and we set  as a small positive number close to zero. Then the constraints in
Equations (26) can be transferred as below:
(xfi )
k(Jfi (x
k)− Jbi (xk)) ≤ T (efi )k − , (27a)
−(xfi )k(Jfi (xk)− Jbi (xk)) ≤ T (1− (efi )k)− , (27b)
(xbi)
k(Jbi (x
k)− Jfi (xk)) ≤ T (ebi)k − , (27c)
−(xbi)k(Jbi (xk)− Jfi (xk)) ≤ T (1− (ebi)k)− . (27d)
Then we can find the calibrated cost coefficient vector C by solving the mixed–integer linear
program problem below:
minimize
C
∑
1≤k≤K
∑
i∈Iexit
(
(efi )
k + (ebi)
k
)
subject to Equations (27),
Cr ≥ 1.
(28)
In our simulation, the capacity per lane is 1100 vph (vehicles per hour). We pick the total
demand D as 3000 vph. We vary the demand for exit link 1 from 1150 vph to 1850 vph. For each
demand configuration, xf1 , x
b
1, x
f
2 , and x
b
2 are recorded. In our simulation, we set the intrinsic
features of every entry lane to be uniform and the geometry of two exit links to be symmetric.
Thus we add the equality constraints below in our calibration process to reflect the symmetry:
Cf1 = C
f
2 = C
b,
λ1 = λ2,
µ1 = µ2.
(29)
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Figure 5: Model prediction of the proportion of bifurcating lane users, xbi is compared to simulation
generated data.
After performing calibration process described above, we obtained the following cost coefficient
vector C:
Cf1 = C
f
2 = C
b = 1.45,
λ1 = λ2 = 0.87,
µ1 = µ2 = 0.69,
ν = 1.
(30)
Note that the obtained values of C satisfy (25), thus, with this C, we can predict the unique
equilibrium x for each flow configuration Q. Also, since for i ∈ Iexit, we have λi < 1 and µi < 1,
the capacity increase effect on bifurcating lane users is validated.
4.2 Model Validation
Having obtained the calibrated cost coefficient vector C in (30), we proceeded to validate our
model using independently obtained simulation data from SUMO. We validate our model under
the total demand of 3200 vph. As Figure 5 shows, our model successfully predicts the proportion
of bifurcating lane users for either destination link. It is an obvious linear relationship which is
consistent with our intuition. When the normalized demand for the same exit link increases, the
proportion of bifurcating lane users increases due to the increasing cost for taking the feed–through
lane designed exclusively for the exit link. The simulation results show an impressive accuracy of
our model in the prediction of vehicles’ aggregate lane choice behavior. We also obtained similar
results when the total demand was varied.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we extended our previous work [18] to another commonly encountered traffic diverge
scenario. We assumed that vehicles are selfish and built a macroscopic model of vehicles’ aggregating
lane choice behavior at diverges with a middle bifurcating lane using Wardrop conditions. We
then proved the existence and uniqueness of the resulting Wardrop equilibrium. Next, we used
a microscopic traffic simulation software, SUMO, to generate data to calibrate and validate our
model. The calibration process is shown to be easy. In the end, the validation results turned out
to be promising, and in the future, we are looking forward to validating our model using real world
data and under other similar traffic scenarios such as left-turning slots.
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